The gap between the willingness to accept and willingness to pay is the outcome of incomplete valuation. The problem therefore is more about completing the valuation procedure. The first part of the solution involves two items: one is the inclusion of the direct and indirect income effects and the other is the inclusion of the substitution effect between the numeraire good (i.e., income) and the good under consideration. The second part of the solution concerns the respective hedonic content of income, the good, and the setting. These two explanations point to a third solution that puts the setting together with the income and substitution effects.
INTRODUCTION
One of the sticking points in economics is that the theoretical equality of the willingness to accept (WTA) and willingness to pay (WTP) is not often validated by empirical work. In fact, the WTA-WTP gap can turn out to be a substantial amount. Henderson (1941) was the first to raise the problem in a commentary to Hicks (1939) . Later, Krutilla (1967) pointed out the same issue in the context of environmental goods. Gregory and Brown (1999) and Harowitz and McConnell (2002) are the more recent surveys on the topic. This paper argues that the equality of the WTA and WTP is possible if the corresponding marginal utility of income, U Y , is the same across alternative states (Hicks 1939; Hicks 1941) . If so, the gains and losses of equal amounts of money necessarily indicate the same effects and it implies that the utility function assumes a symmetric sigmoid form.
1 Results of Willig (1967) for the private goods and those of Mäler (1974) and Randall and Stoll (1980) for the public goods are therefore easy to comprehend. Otherwise, the income effects need to be fully accounted for in the valuation procedure. Along with the income effects, the substitutability of the good under consideration with its numeraire good (i.e., income) also needs to be included in the valuation procedure (Randall and Stoll 1980; Hanemann 1991) .
This paper furthermore argues that the equality of the WTA and WTP is possible if there is no hedonic value to consider. Fundamentally, the hedonic explanation to the WTA-WTP gap is less about being familiar with transactions (List 2003) , utilizing incentive-compatible mechanisms in the valuation procedure (Coursey et al. 1987; Plott and Zeiler 2005) , or even incorporating the income and substitution effects pointed out earlier. Rather, the issue is more about the psychology with regard to income, the good, and/or the setting. 2 Income does not affect the valuation of the 1 Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Thaler (1980) good if money does not assume the role of status symbol or basis for social comparisons (Frank 1985) . Similarly, a good that is intended for exchange and not for use or enjoyment does not affect the outcome of the valuation (Kahneman et al. 1990 ). Otherwise, emotions (Damasio 1994; Loewenstein 1996; Peters et al. 2003) and moral considerations such as existence or intrinsic value (Boyce et al. 1992; Kahneman and Knetsch 1992) would be misrepresented as the valuation of the good. The outcome and process to reach the outcome also do not matter in the valuation of the good if the setting is not relevant (Loewenstein and Prelect 1993; Redelmeier and Kahneman 1996; Köszegi and Rabin 2006) . Otherwise, the setting wherein a good is received in an ex ante condition of, say, no possession or given up in an ex ante condition of possession is a relevant dimension in the valuation regardless if money involved or not (Kahneman et al. 1990; Kahneman et al. 1991; Knetsch 1995; Knetsch and Wong 2009) . The same applies if the situation is risky (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) or riskless (Thaler 1980; Tversky and Kahneman 1991) . In fact, differences in the valuations remain even if bi-directional compensations between losers and gainers of the transaction are allowed.
Discarding the empirical issues involved in carrying out the valuation of the good, the puzzle of the WTA-WTP gap is simply about incomplete valuation. 3 Completing the valuation is therefore the solution to the problem. One part of the solution is the "economics of valuation," which concerns the income and substitution effects, and the other is called the "psychology of valuation," which deals with the respective hedonic contents of income, the good, and the setting.
Lastly, the paper submits the subjective well-being (SWB) valuation procedure as a third solution Studies on endowment actually draw attention to the perception of the setting in explaining the WTA-WTP gap and not on income and/or the good per se.
3 WTP became the choice of valuation over WTA on the presumption that WTA is flawed. Knetsch (1990) and Gregory and Brown (1999) note that using WTP when WTA is appropriate implies two things: first, the good is undervalued; and, second, allocative efficiency is effectively abandoned.
to the problem. The SWB procedure is anchored on both income and substitution effects, but it has two formulations. The "exclusive" form discards all hedonic content of income, the good, and the setting. In contrast, the "inclusive" form maintains that the setting is relevant in the valuation procedure. Di Tella et al. (2001), Ferrer-i-Carbonell and van Praag (2002) , and Welsch (2002) were the first to use (a version of) the exclusive form procedure. Welsch and Kühling (2009) and Frey et al. (2010) are recent surveys on the topic.
Part 2 presents the economics and psychology solutions to the puzzle of the WTA-WTP gap. The demonstration is done at the conceptual level in order to point out the possibility of the incomplete valuation. Part 3 presents an alternative solution. Again, the demonstration is done at the conceptual level to draw attention to its parallels between the economics and psychology solutions as well as to bring out the strength of the alternative. What is asserted in the end is that an integrated approach might be more helpful in solving the incomplete valuation problem and in advancing the valuation procedure. The last part concludes.
FIGURING OUT THE WTA-WTP GAP

Incomplete Economics
Consider a standard utility function like U = U(Y, Z), where Y is income and Z is the good. Y and
Z are exogenous and assumed to carry no hedonic content. By convention, Y is the numeraire good, or the accepted unit upon which the valuation of the good is anchored. Other attributes are excluded in the discussion in order to simplify the exposition. The usual assumptions about the utility function apply. Of course, the foremost assertion here is that choice-actions as manifested in buying and selling reflect true utility. Such assertion takes the market or pseudo-market as the principal site for a transaction. This textbook setup leads to the valuation of Z as:
Holding the utility constant at the ex ante state with increasing Z or holding the utility constant in the ex post state without increasing Z obtains the same valuation of Z in terms of Y. Such result is reached because U Y (i.e., direct income effect) is unchanged across the alternative states. It is then easy to define the valuation of Z in terms of the alternative states, as follows: 
The change in U Y in this case is a crucial explanation why WTA turns out to be larger than WTP. in the process. There must be some unaccounted income effect brought about by the changes in income. This conclusion is the same for both price-constrained and quantity-constrained valuations. The required correction is obvious.
The claim is that the utility function takes the form U = F[Y, Z(Y)] if the indirect income effect is
internalized in the valuation procedure. The expressions and assumptions are as defined earlier. In this case, however, Z is necessarily not anymore exogenous to Y, and its valuation is: Randall and Stoll (1980) and Hanemann (1990) . The analysis is also consistent with that of Amiran and Hagen (2003) who use an asymptotic bounded utility function. What is more important is the finding that these equations specify 
Missing Psychology
The psychology of valuation looks at three things. Consider next Z in the same function. Goods that are generally intended for exchange do not carry any hedonic content regardless when or where trade occurs. Dispassionate or routine transaction rids Z of hedonic content. If so, Equation 1a also holds. In contrast, goods for use or enjoyment take on hedonic content. Attachment, sentiment, motivation, attention, etc. make "use value" more salient thereby producing loss aversion and reluctance to trade. In fact, the price of a good is not anymore a relevant consideration when "use value" governs both thinking and feeling. The third item to consider is that the setting is not trivial. That is, the setting in which Z is received under an ex ante condition of no possession and that in which Z is given up under an ex ante condition of possession matters. Suppose for now Y and Z do not carry hedonic content. The
Ignoring this aspect implies an incomplete valuation of Z.
In view of the above discussions, the internalization of the hedonic contents of Y and Z leads the utility function to take the form U = H[Y, Z, E(Y, Z)], where
internalization of the setting requires the utility function to take the form U = H[(Y, Z, Q(Z)],
where Q is the "setting" function. The valuation of Z, in this case, is: 
The Alternative: Subjective Well-Being Approach to Valuation
The subjective well-being (SWB) procedure, as an alternative to the ones presented in the earlier sections, asserts three things. First, choice-action does not reflect true utility. So going back to classical utility is the right direction to pursue because analysis is then anchored on personal 6 Putting the economics and psychology of valuation together obtains a utility function of the form U =
H[(Y(Z), Z(Y), E(Y, Z), Q(Z)]
, where Y and Z are assumed endogenous to each other and the three elements of hedonic content are assumed not trivial. Thus,
is the valuation of Z. As with footnote 7, ) experience. Yet, the shift does not really bring a fundamental change in the manner by which utility analysis per se is conducted, except that doing so allows for a second assertion, namely: a market or pseudo-market setting is not a helpful framework in the context of valuation. The discomfort with choice-action and the market is really about what meaning to put on the valuation of a good when a person is not capable, even powerless, in changing the situation given corporate power, political expediency, and class interest. Put simply, choice-action and the market are not necessary in order to perform the valuation of a good if the numeraire good is well defined and it is accepted as such. The third assertion is the following: the hedonic contents of income, the good, and the setting might be the ones being valued and not the good itself. The proposal is to decouple emotions from the procedure but retain the elements for a complete valuation procedure.
Nevertheless, the setting may be a valuable aspect to consider given that the nature of endowment can have an effect on the valuation of a good.
Since true utility is an internal state of being, the SWB procedure begins with a claim that the self-reported state of being exhibits a positive monotonic transformation of the underlying true utility. That is, SWB i ≡ h[U i ( · ) ], where SWB is the self-reported state of being, SWB 2 > SWB 1 if U 2 ( · ) > U 1 ( · ), and state i+1 is deemed superior to state i for i = 1,…, n. Note that SWB does not involve its hedonic component given that the hedonic contents of Z and Y are discarded in this context. 7 The contention is that a person is able to distinguish the alternative states of being 7 Studies find that SWB is comprised of the separable and independently measurable components of affect and satisfaction (Lucas et al. 1996; . "Affect" is the hedonic component of the state of being and it is separable into positive and negative feelings (Watson et al. 1988) . "Judgment" is the self-assessment of life in general. Judgment is generally more stable than affect.
Studies find that measures of SWB are reliable, robust, and valid. Reliability tests using self-assessments obtained from one person but at different points in the same interview (Ehrhardt et al. 2000) or from the same person but at different periods (Krueger and Schkade 2008) give consistent and stable results. People who say they are happy at time t are generally also happy in time t+1, excluding any extraordinary or dramatic life events between the two periods. Validity tests find strong evidence that measures of SWB regardless of what metric is used for the self-assessment. The implication then is as follows: a "better" situation that is judged superior to that of a "good" situation is viewed as such; similarly, a "good" situation that is judged superior to that of a "bad" situation is viewed as such, etc. 
and capture what they are suppose to measure. Studies find people with high subjective well-being smile more (Ekman et al. 1990; Pavot et al. 1991) and they are rated with high subjective well-being by their spouses, relatives, or peers (Costa and McRae 1988; Sandvik et al. 1993) . Even studies in neuroscience find a tight correspondence between subjective well-being and the location of brain activity associated with well-being (Davidson 2003; Urry et al. 2004) .
The equations are called "exclusive" SWB procedures (c.f., Equations 3a and 3b). There is no doubt that the above equations are facsimiles to those in Section 2.1, thus validating the assertion that there is no fundamental change in the way the valuation of the good is carried out. However, the point here is that the alternative procedure is a better setup because it bypasses the issues that burden the extant procedures.
The setting can be accommodated in the valuation procedure in the same manner as Z is introduced as an external variable in the SWB function (c.f., footnote 5). In doing so, the setting is introduced but the assessment of feelings or emotions that are associated with the setting are 
precluded. The SWB function thus takes the form SWB = H[[Y, Z(Y)] + Q(Z)] or SWB = H[[Y(Z), Z(Y)] + Q(Z)]
CONCLUSION
The paper argued that incomplete valuation is the cause of the WTA-WTP gap, and so complete valuation is the solution to the problem. The first solution concerns the inclusion of the income and substitution effects. The second solution concerns the inclusion of the hedonic content of income, the good, and the setting. Pursuing the first solution alone fulfills the expectations for the efficient allocation of goods but does not fulfill psychological expectations, especially when moral satisfaction like existence or intrinsic value, emotion, and other factors like attitude and personality are relevant. Pursuing the second solution alone fulfills the psychological expectations but does not fulfill efficiency requirements, especially if scarcity is relevant. Moreover, the focus on the hedonic content might result in emotion as the one being valued and not the good per se.
Finally, the paper presented the subjective well-being approach to valuation as an alternative to the extant procedures. The third solution decouples choice-action, market, and hedonic values from the valuation procedure even as it takes into account income and substitution effects as well as the relevance of the setting in the valuation of the good. It thus presents an approach that is not only dispassionate but also productive in advancing the economics and psychology of valuation. 
